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Abstract: This paper examines the effects of poverty and schooling returns on child 
labour in Vietnam using household-level data from the Vietnam Living Standards Survey 
(VLSS) for 1997-98.   I find that poverty is a robust determinant of child labour in 
Vietnam.  Being above the poverty line reduces child work by as much as 146 hours a 
year.  There is little additional effect of further increase s in income giving support to the 
idea that child non-work is a luxury good.  Schooling returns are statistically significant 
but the effect on child work hours is small.  Interestingly, higher returns in the urban area 
increase child work hours in adjoining rural regions.  This result is consistent with a 
possibility of increasing returns to education and migration to urban centers for higher 
training, while remaining siblings work more to make up for the foregone earnings of the 
migrants and to perhaps pay for the added education expense.  I do not find evidence of 
credit constraints affecting child hours. 
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1 Introduction 
Although world child labour participation rates have declined steadily over the past half-
century, it is still a big problem today as about a quarter of a billion children regularly 
engage in some form of employment (International Labour Organisation, 2002) often to 
the detriment of health and human capital formation.  Fundamentally, child labo ur is an 
issue of inter-temporal allocation:  a tradeoff between consumption from the unskilled 
child’s wages (and possibly saved education expenses) today and consumption from the 
skilled adult’s wages tomorrow.  If the skilled wage is sufficiently higher than the 
unskilled wage, then it makes sense for families to invest in education and for the child to 
work less today.  However, if the child’s wages are an important part of consumption 
today, that is, when the family is on the margin of subsistence, then tomorrow’s skilled 
wage ceases to matter as much and the child would work more today.  In other words, the 
extent of child labour depends on the level of poverty and on the returns to schooling.   
 This paper examines the effects of poverty and schooling returns on child labo ur 
in Vietnam using household-level data from the Vietnam Living Standards Survey 
(VLSS) for 1997-98.  Determining whether poverty or low schooling returns is the more 
dominant cause for child labour is important for the type of policies that should be 
pursued to reduce child labour.  For instance, if poverty is the main cause, then policies 
directed specifically at the poor would have the desired effect on child labo ur.  If low 
schooling returns are driving child labour, then policies should focus on improving the 
quality of schools or promoting the expansion of skilled jobs.  
 A number of empirical studies in various countries have looked at poverty’s role 
in child labour.  The findings have been mixed. Studies by Ray (2000) in Pakistan, 
Nielsen (1998) in Zambia, Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) in Ghana, and Sasaki and 
Temesgen (1999) in Peru do not find a significant positive relationship between poverty 
and child labor, while studies by Ray (2000) in Peru, and Blunch and Verner (2001) in 
Ghana do find a significant positive relationship between poverty and child labour.  I find 
that poverty is a robust determinant of child labour in Vietnam.  The number of hours that 
children work declines drastically as families rise above the poverty line but the reduction 
in work hours falls dramatically for further increases in income.  This finding is 
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consistent with the idea that child non-work is a luxury good, a notion that is the premise 
for a number of theoretical models of child labour (Basu and Van 1998). 
 Although the theoretical link between returns to education and child labour is 
intuitive enough and can be easily shown in a model with endogeneous human capital 
formation, I am unaware of previous empirical studies that explicitly look at this 
relationship.  For Vietnam, I do not find evidence that differences in schooling returns 
have an important effect on child work hours.  The finding is robust to specifications 
allowing for the possibility of geographic labour mobility.  Relatedly, I also do not find 
evidence that credit constraints affect the child labour decision or evidence that certain 
groups have less access to skilled jobs and thus would not respond to higher average 
returns to schooling. 
 Finally, one should note that while I focus on the importance of the broad factors 
of poverty and returns to education, a number of other studies have looked at a host of 
causes of child labour including income distribution, credit constraints, intergenerational 
persistence, gender and birth order, parental characteristics, coordination fail ure, and 
social norms.1   The issues studied in these other papers are not exclusive of poverty and 
schooling returns but are rather in most cases, factors that are consequences of or affect 
or are incidental to poverty and returns to education. 
 This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 gives a brief description of the data 
and of child labour in Vietnam.  Section 3 describes the methodology I employ including 
a discussion of the variables used.  The issues of labour market access, labour mobility, 
and credit constraints will also be discussed here.  Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Data   
The VLSS 1997-98 is the second in a series of nationally representative surveys in 
Vietnam.  It contains information for 6,002 households consisting of 28,636 individuals 
with 9,937 children aged 15 years or younger. Community level information was 
collected on rural and minor urban areas including price data for all important items, the 
geographic region and population in the communes, the availability of schools in the 
village, and the availability of other important resources such as roads, waterways, 
electricity, and water. 
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 Table 1 gives work statistics for children aged 6 to 15.  About 22% of children do 
some extent of work and of those the mean hours of work is 879 for the year.  The same 
fraction of boys and girls work but girls on average work about 85 hours more than boys.  
The disparity between the ethnic majority (Kinh) and minority groups (the non-Kinh) is 
stark.  The Kinh have a participation rate of 21% while 31% of non-Kinh children work.  
The non-Kinh work over 1,000 hours a year on average while the Kinh working children 
work 830 hours.  This trend is consistent with the well -documented evidence that the 
ethnic minorities (non-Kinh) are among the most severely disadvantaged in Vietnam.2 
 Most child labour in Vietnam is concentrated in the rural areas where 27% of 
children work compared with 7% in the urban areas.  The north also has a higher 
incidence of child labour with participation rates ranging from 26% to 38%, while in the 
relatively affluent south, only 13% to 14% of the children work.  However, mean work 
hours are lowest at 549 in the Red River Delta region (the area around the capital, Hanoi) 
and highest at 1,032 in the Central Highlands and along the Central Coast region.  This 
last figure is not surprising since there is a high concentration of ethnic minorities in the 
Central Highlands and along the Central Coast. 
 I derive a variable called ‘per capita net expenditure’ to proxy for household non-
child income.  A detailed explanation of this variable is provided in the next section. 
Child labour is most prevalent in families in the lowest income group (income being 
proxied by per capita household expenditures). In this poorest group 35% of children 
work and those who work average over 1,000 hours a year. Participation rates decline 
with increasing income as do hours, with the one exception that mean hours worked 
increases for the highest group. Since participation  rates are so low for this highest 
income group, this will likely not affect the analysis.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics for variables used in the analysis for the 
sample of 7079 children aged 6-15.  The number of boys and girls are roughly equal 
while 82% of the sample are from the ethnic majority group.  Summary statistics for 
other household, community variables and regional dummies are also provided in table 2.  
3 Methodology 
The basic specification used in our analysis is as follows: 
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          0 2 3i i i i ih rte u1 I X , (1) 
where ih  denotes the number of hours worked by child i , iI  is a vector of dummy 
variables indicating the level of per capita household expenditures, irte  is the returns to 
schooling in the region where child i resides, iX  is a vector of control variables including 
child, family, and the community characteristics, and iu  is an error term assumed 
identically, independently distributed normal.  The unit of observation is a child aged 6 -
15.  I drop the subscript i  in subsequent notation where it is unambiguous to do so.  
Since the labor participation rate within the sample is only 22%, OLS estimation is 
clearly inappropriate.  I instead use a Tobit model to estimate the hours equation.  
 The vector iI  is a vector of dummy variables indicating household per capita 
income.  I use expenditures to proxy for income for two reasons.  First, expenditures are 
more readily accessible from the survey data than income.  About 80% of the population 
do not have wage income but are rather, self -employed.  Calculating household income 
for the group of non-wage earners is difficult and subject to error.   Second, income, 
particularly farm income, is subject to shocks and short-term fluctuations whereas 
households tend to smooth consumption.  
 I am interested in the portion of household expenditure that does not inc lude 
income from the child’s work.  Total household expenditure, however, would include the 
child’s income.  I address this endogeneity of the income and child work hours by 
subtracting from household expenditures an ‘imputed child income’ based on a wage 
predicted by the child’s characteristics.  Prediction of the child’s wage is made from the 
following log wage equation: 
 
,log
log
76
2
543210




ekHoursPerWeFemale
ExpExpUniVocSecWage
 (2) 
where Wage  is the hourly wage, Exp  is work experience,3 Fem ale  is a dummy 
variable, and S ec , Voc , and Uni  are dummies taking a value of 1 if the individual has, 
as the highest education achievement, finished secondary school, vocational school, or 
college, respectively.  The log of the variable HoursPerWeek  is included to control for 
different types of wage contracts.  The error term v  is assumed normal i.i.d..  Equation 2 
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is estimated using ordinary least squares for all wage earners in each of the six 
geographic regions in Vietnam. 
 From each child’s characteristics reported in the survey, I use the preceding 
estimation to impute an hourly wage for each working child.   This method of imputing 
hourly wage is based on two assumptions. First, it assumes that non -wage workers would 
earn equivalently the same as wage workers when they have the same individual 
characteristics. In other words, all workers have access to both wage and non -wage labor 
markets.  Second, it assumes that any two children of the same gender, experience, 
education level, who worked the same numbers of hours in the past week and lives in the 
same region can earn the same hourly wage.  Differences in productivity that  might arise 
due to unobserved heterogeneity among different children are ignored.  Since variation in 
child wages is small, unobserved heterogeneity is probably also small.  Imputing child 
wage in this way also assumes that differences in adult and child wages are fully reflected 
in differences in age, education, experience, and hours worked.  
             The imputed hourly wage is then multiplied by the number of hours the child has 
worked in the year to arrive at the child’s income for the year. This is subtracted from 
total household expenditure and divided by the number of people in the  household to give 
what I call ‘net household expenditure per capita.’4 
 I base the income categories on the standard poverty line used in the literature.  
Based on a basket of goods satisfying a 2,100 calorie-per-day requirement, Glewwe, 
Gragnolati and Zaman (2002) calculated a poverty line to be 1,789,871 dong per person 
per year for the 1997-98 sample period.  I consider five different income groupings:  
those whose net household expenditure per capita is below this poverty line (the omitted 
category), those above the line but below twice the poverty line (pcexp1=1), those 
between two and three times the poverty line (pcexp2=1), those between three and four 
times the poverty line (pcexp3=1), and those above four times the poverty line 
(pcexp4=1). 
 I generate variation in the rte  variable by dividing the sample into 24 groups:  {6 
geographic regions }×{rural,urban)×{male, female}.  For each group, I  estimate the log 
wage equation: 
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           20 1 2 3 4log _ log ,Wage S ec Above Exp Exp HoursPerWeek e  (3) 
which is similar to equation (2) except for the one lone education variable, _S ec Above , 
which takes a value of 1 for people completing secondary school or education beyond the 
secondary level.   Note that the gender dummy present in equation 2 has been removed 
since gender is now a dimension along which the different groups are constructed.  The 
OLS point estimate of the coefficient 1  is used as the value of rte  for each of the 24 
groups.   
 
4 Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the Tobit model for 
the full sample and for the urban and rural samples separately.  Being above the poverty 
line is highly significant for each sample estimate.  On average, compared to a child in a 
household below the poverty line, a child in a household just above the poverty line but 
below twice the poverty line works 146 hours less for the rural sample, 50 h ours less for 
the urban sample, and 137 hours less for the full sample.  Note that the reduction in hours 
worked falls sharply for further increases in the expenditure level.  For instance, in the 
full sample, there is only a 27-hour difference between being just above the poverty line 
and being one expenditure level above; only a nine-hour difference between this group 
and the one above; and no further reduction in work hours in going to the next highest 
expenditure group.  These results suggest a highly nonlinear relationship between child 
work hours and income (expenditures) supporting the idea that child ‘non-work’ is a 
luxury good5. 
 Returns to schooling (rte) is statistically significant for the full sample.  However, 
the effect is small.  A ten percent increase in the return reduces the numbers of hours 
worked by less than ten hours for the entire year.  Schooling returns is not statistically 
significant within the urban and rural samples, suggesting that the variable’s significance 
for the full sample is driven by rural-urban differences in schooling returns. 
 As expected, work hours increase with age.  Children belonging to the majority 
ethnic group “kinh” work 46 hours less in the full sample than non-Kinh children and 57 
hours less in the rural sample.  The kinh variable is not significant for the urban sample -
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most likely because the number of non-kinh were too few in the urban areas.  Gender is 
only statistically significant (at the 5% level) in the rural sample where being a girl 
increases work hours but only by 25 hours a year. 
 Among the household variables, the number of adults in a household is 
statistically significant but again the effect is small.  Having one additional adult in the 
household reduces child work by only 23 hours in the full and rural samples and by 14 
hours in the urban sample.  Children in households with female heads work 38 hours less 
in the rural sample and 35 hours less in the full sample.  The education level of the 
household head (educyr98) only matters in the urban sample where an additional year of 
schooling reduces the child’s work hours by about 9 hours.  The size of the household’s 
landholding does not affect child work hours.  
 In the rural sample, having a primary school within the village, an indication of 
lower schooling costs, reduces hours of work by 100 in one year.  Having access to a 
transport waterway reduces hours worked by 34 hours.  Interestingly, the presence of a 
secondary school in the village and access to a road actually increases work hours by 69 
and 41 respectively.  This result is consistent with the possibility that economic activity 
in the village increases with the presence of both of these public goods.  It is important 
though the increase in the economic opportunity raises wages for those with  and those 
without a secondary school education about equally.  Otherwise, the effect that I observe 
these variables having on school hours would have been captured by the rte variable. 
 In summary, the biggest effect on child work hours is being above the  poverty 
line.  The effect on hours for increases in household expenditures beyond that tapers off 
quickly.  Differences in schooling returns do not seem to affect work hours much.  Before 
concluding that labour market conditions do not affect child labour in Vietnam, I consider 
the issues of labour mobility and labor market access.  First, families may be responding 
to labor market conditions not only in their own village or province but also in the nearby 
city center.  Second, labour markets may be segmented.  That is, even if schooling returns 
are observed to be higher, the skilled jobs may not be accessible to some groups within 
society.  Those children belonging to this group would thus not reduce work hours to 
increase investment in education to take advantage of the higher return.  I consider these 
two issues in the next two subsections. 
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4.1 Labour Mobility and Labour Market Access 
Migration to the urban centers is a common phenomenon in the developing countries and 
Vietnam is no exception.  Half a million people migrated to Ho Chi Minh City in the 
second half of the 1990s (Thanh, 2002).  About 20% of the population in Ho Chi Minh 
City are considered ‘illegal’ migrants.  With rural-urban migration being so active in 
Vietnam, it is reasonable to think that child labour decisions are made considering not 
only schooling returns in the local labour market, but also that in the closest urban center 
as well.  To accommodate the possibility of migration, I include the schooling return of 
the nearest urban center (rteurb) in the hours regression for the rural sample.  Results are 
shown in table 4.  Interestingly, the sign on the rteurb is positive and statistically 
significant, meaning that a higher return in the urban center results in a rural child 
working more hours!   
Two possibilities may explain this result.  First, suppose families in the 
countryside do invest more in a child’s education when schooling returns are higher.  
Investment in education however, is likely to exhibit increasing returns, that is, th e return 
to a college education is much higher than that of a secondary education.   Intra -
household allocation of resources would therefore not be uniform.  Many families are 
likely to invest in one child (or only a few children) by sending him to school in the city 
leaving the remaining siblings to stay at home and work longer hours to make up for the 
forgone earnings of the migrant and to perhaps pay for the added education expense. 6  
This would result in a positive relationship between returns in the urban center and work 
hours in the rural areas. 
 A second possibility is that of labour market segmentation.  Some groups in 
society may not have access to the skilled labour market and thus the higher returns to 
schooling do not apply to them.  If higher demand for skilled labour in the urban center 
corresponds to overall economic growth, then demand for unskilled labo ur in the 
neighboring rural areas would likely increase as well.  Those groups without access to the 
skilled labor market would work more in response to the higher unskilled wage. 
 I test for these possibilities by interacting the kinh, girl, and hdagforest7 variables 
with the rte variable and the roadtransp and watertransp variables with the rteurb 
variable.  Recall that kinh takes a value of 1 when the child belongs to the majority ethnic 
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group.  The non-Kinh in Vietnam are made up mostly of the ethnic minorities who are 
more disadvantaged economically than the Kinh.  Higher returns to schooling may not 
apply to this group.  For similar reasons, I interact the girl and hdagforest variables with 
rte.  Household heads who are farmers or work in forestry may have fewer connections in 
the skilled sector and thus their children may have less access to skilled jobs.  
 Interacting roadtransp and watertransp with rteurb is based on the idea that 
villages without access to a road or waterway would tend to be more isolated from the 
cities and people living in these villages would thus have less connections to the cities 
and are less likely to migrate. 
 Results for these specifications are given in table 4.  None of the interaction terms 
described above are significant.  Thus I cannot find evidence of labo ur market 
segmentation or labour mobility being important.  However, one should be careful to 
qualify that this non-finding is for the particular variables used here.  Labo ur market 
segmentation, for instance, may exist along different dimensions. 8  The expenditure 
variables continue to be highly significant and their marginal effects show that poverty 
continues to be the major determinant of child work hours.  
  
4.2 Credit Constraints 
Children in poorer households may work more possibly at the cost of human capital 
development and higher future earnings if their families are credit constrained. 9  If 
education is self-financed or if credit is less readily available to the poor, then one would 
see schooling returns not mattering in child labor decisions for the very poor; mattering 
more for those with more resources; and again possibly not mattering at all for t he very 
affluent for whom education may be more important for its consumption rather than 
capital value.  I test for the possibility of credit constraints by interacting the four 
expenditure dummy variables (pcexp1-4) with schooling returns (rte). 
 Results of the estimation for the full, rural only, and urban only samples are 
shown in table 5.  None of the variables containing rte are statistically significant.  Again, 
the child work hours can be explained almost entirely by being above or below the 
poverty line.  Since I am controlling for the possibility of credit constraints, this gives 
further support to the idea that child non-work is a luxury good in Vietnam. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
Child labour in terms of work hours is explained almost entirely by pover ty in Vietnam.10  
Hours worked drop drastically as a child moves above the poverty line. Returns to 
education are statistically significant for some specifications of the model but the extent 
of the effect is small.  I find some evidence to suggest that rur al-urban migration is 
important and that households are possibly allocating more resources to one child in 
response to higher schooling returns in the cities.  Again, however, the effect of schooling 
returns on work hours is small.  I don’t find evidence t o support the presence of credit 
constraints. 
 The results, though, should be taken with caution. First, the rte variable was 
generated by constructing 24 different groupings within the sample. The low variation 
thus presents a problem in the power of the test of the effect of rte and the test for credit 
constraints. Subsequent studies would need to find creative ways to generate more 
variation in rte. Second, I only address one type of endogeneity between child hours 
worked and household income by subtracting out the imputed child income. There is still 
the problem that child hours worked and household per capita rxprnditures are jointly 
determined. An alternative would be to find a suitable instrument for per capita 
expenditure. 
 With these caveats, these results point out that policies to reduce child labour in 
Vietnam should be the same policies to alleviate poverty directly.  Expanding 
employment and increasing wages for the unskilled would reduce child labour in 
Vietnam.   Thus, the fear that expanded trade would increase child labour appears 
misplaced in Vietnam.  If per capita expenditure works as a good predictor for wages, as 
wages rise for adults, child labour would be reduced. 
 Based on these results, programs to alleviate poverty directly should continue to 
merit high priority.  Improving the lot of the rural poor through investments in 
infrastructure and direct educational subsidy would have high social return as this in the 
longer run would reduce child labour and increase human capital development.  
Particularly, direct assistance for the ethnic minorities is a worthwhile policy to reduce 
child labour. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 For a survey of issues, see Basu (1999); on income distribut ion, see Swinnerton and Rogers 
(1999); on credit constraints, see Baland and Robinson (2000) and also Ranjan (2001); on 
intergenerational persistence, see Emerson and Souza (2003); on gender and birth order, see 
Horowitz and Wang (2002) and also Emerson and Souza (2002); on coordination failures, see 
Dessy and Pallage (2001); and on the importance of social norms, see Lopez -Calva (2001). 
2  For a discussion on the disparities between the Kinh and non -Kinh, see Glewwe, Gragnolati, 
and Zaman (2002). 
3 In the VLSS, there are some children who started schooling at the age of 5, so to avoid negative 
values I calculate work experience as   5 _ _Exp Age Years of S chooling .  
4 I ignore the possibility of scale economies in household size.  
5 I also ran alternative specifications replacing the category expenditure variables with the log of 
per capita expenditure and also included a quadratic term for per capita expenditure. The results 
also reveal the significant nonlinear relationship between hours of child work and per cap ita 
ecpenditure. However, the results using the category groupings highlight more clearly the 
nonlinear relationship around the poverty line. 
6 The idea that migration from the countryside results in those remaining in agriculture to work 
more was introduced by Sen (1966) as an explanation of “surplus labor” in agriculture.  .  
7 This variable takes a value of one if the head of household is employed in agriculture or forestry 
sector. 
8 A good variable to test for labor market segmentation is “Communist Part y Membership.”  The 
idea is that children of party cadre would have better access to skilled jobs than those outside the 
party.   The VLSS does allow respondents to specify whether they are party members.  However, 
interestingly, according to the responses in the sample, the number of household heads who were 
members of the communist party was zero! 
9 For models highlighting credit constraints as an explanation of child labo ur, see Baland and 
Robinson (2000), and Ranjan (2001).  
10 My results here are consistent with Edmonds’ (2001) finding that improvement in living 
standards accounted for most of the reduction in child labour incidence in Vietnam over the 
period 1993-97.  
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Table 1. Work Statistics for Children Aged  6-15 
 Number of Children 
(Working and Non- 
Working) 
Participation Rates Mean Hours Worked 
(includes working 
children only) 
TOTAL  
 
Boys 
Girls 
7,079 
 
3,647 
3,432 
22 
 
22 
22 
879 
 
838 
923 
Kinh 
Non-Kinh 
5,869 
1,210 
21 
31 
830 
1,033 
Rural 
Urban 
5,595 
1,484 
27 
7 
883 
804 
S. Central Coast & 
Central Highlands  
Southeast 
Mekong River Delta 
Red River Delta 
N.East & N.West 
N. Central Coast 
1,206 
 
1,362 
1,343 
1,113 
1,170 
885 
15 
 
13 
14 
26 
35 
38 
1,032 
 
944 
958 
549 
991 
871 
Per capita 
Expenditure (dong) 
Less than 1,789,871 
(poverty line) 
Between 1,789,871 
and 3,579,742 
Between 3,579,742 
and 5,369,613 
Between 5,369,613 
and 7,159,484 
More than 7,159,484 
 
 
3,056 
 
2,764 
 
704 
 
299 
 
256 
 
 
35 
 
16 
 
8 
 
4 
 
3 
 
 
1,015 
 
616 
 
585 
 
254 
 
608 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Children Aged  6-15 (7079 total, variable names in 
parentheses) 
 Mean SD 
Child 
Hours of work 
Age 
Girl 
Kinh (majority ethnic group) 
 
217.58 
10.71 
0.49 
0.82 
 
521.85 
2.85 
0.50 
0.38 
Household 
1,789,871< Net Expenditure per capita 3,579,742 (pcexp1) 
3,579,742< Net Expenditure per capita 5,369,613 (pcexp2) 
5,369,613< Net Expenditure per capita 7,159,484 (pcexp3) 
7,159,484< Net Expenditure per capita (pcexp4) 
 
Age of Household Head (age_HH_head) 
Gender of Household Head (headfem) 
Years of Education of Household Head (educyr98) 
 
No. of Adults (numadult) 
No. of Children (numchild) 
 
Land Holding (totalland) 
 
0.38 
0.085 
0.035 
0.028 
 
42.78 
0.17 
7.54 
 
2.95 
2.84 
 
28,370.69 
 
0.49 
0.28 
0.18 
0.17 
 
9.89 
0.37 
4.036 
 
1.29 
1.26 
 
58,729.69 
Occupation of Household Head 
Leaders (hdleader) 
Professionals (hdprofessional) 
Sales (hdsales) 
Agriculture and forestry (hdagforest) 
Skilled manual (hdskilmanual) 
Machine operators (hdmachineoper) 
 
0.043 
0.061 
0.13 
0.78 
0.18 
0.036 
 
0.20 
0.24 
0.33 
0.41 
0.38 
0.19 
Community Variables 
Primary School (primschool) 
Secondary School (secnschool) 
Road Transportation (roadtransp) 
Water Transportation (watertransp) 
Quality of water supply (watersupply) 
Electricity (elecsupply) 
Price of Rice (riceprice) 
 
0.53 
0.25 
0.81 
0.50 
0.32 
0.91 
3,428.56 
 
0.50 
0.43 
0.39 
0.50 
0.47 
0.29 
492.14 
Region 
Urban 
Southeast 
South Central Coast  
Central Highlands 
North Central Coast 
Red River Delta  
Northeast and Northwest 
 
0.17 
0.13 
0.21 
0.11 
0.15 
0.19 
0.21 
 
0.38 
0.34 
0.41 
0.32 
0.36 
0.39 
0.40 
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Table 3. Tobit Results of Hours of Work 
 Full Sample Urban Sample Rural Sample 
 Coefficient Slope Coefficient Slope Coefficient Slope 
pcexp1 
 
pcexp2 
 
pcexp3 
 
pcexp4 
 
rte 
-835 
(47)** 
-1,342 
(98)** 
-1,785 
(174)** 
-1,753 
(208)** 
-3.58 
(1.38)** 
-137 
 
-164 
 
-173 
 
-172 
 
-0.96 
-1,562 
(297)** 
-1,856 
(360)** 
-2,236 
(450)** 
-2,732 
(563)** 
6.45 
(4.01) 
-50 
 
-51 
 
-52 
 
-53 
 
0.55 
-766 
(48)** 
-1,233 
(111)** 
-1,568 
(227)** 
-1,058 
(314)** 
-4.36 
(2.22) 
-146 
 
-178 
 
-189 
 
-169 
 
-1.3 
agechild 
 
agesqr 
 
girl 
 
kinh 
464 
(79)** 
-5.5 
(3.4) 
73 
(40) 
-161 
(55)** 
124 
 
-1.5 
 
20 
 
-46 
1,414 
(618)* 
-40 
(25) 
-23 
(219) 
-141 
(365) 
120 
 
-3.4 
 
-1.9 
 
-13 
411 
(79)** 
-3.4 
(3.4) 
84 
(42)* 
-181 
(55)** 
122 
 
-1.0 
 
25 
 
-57 
numchild 
 
numadult 
 
headfem 
 
age_HH_head 
 
educyr98 
 
totalland 
 
hdleader 
 
hdprofessional 
 
hdsales 
 
hdagforest 
 
hdskilmanual 
 
hdmachineoper 
-17 
(16) 
-87 
(17)** 
-137 
(59)* 
-1.4 
(2.5) 
-7.1 
(5.9) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
195 
(99)* 
-50 
(96) 
157 
(70)* 
267 
(63)** 
107 
(56) 
-195 
(126) 
-4.6 
 
-23 
 
-35 
 
-0.4 
 
-1.9 
 
0.0 
 
58 
 
-13 
 
45 
 
67 
 
30 
 
-47 
-56 
(88) 
-168 
(77)* 
-1.8 
(218) 
-1.96 
(12) 
-103 
(29)** 
0.009 
(0.004)* 
1,126 
(521)* 
364 
(408) 
603 
(247)* 
628 
(251)* 
21 
(261) 
710 
(385) 
-4.7 
 
-14.2 
 
-0.2 
 
-1.6 
 
-8.7 
 
0.0 
 
186 
 
37 
 
61 
 
67 
 
1.8 
 
90 
-15 
(17) 
-78 
(18)** 
-134 
(63)* 
-0.027 
(2.6) 
1.6 
(6.2) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
112 
(100) 
-84 
(100) 
110 
(77) 
56 
(71) 
103 
(58) 
-273 
(139)* 
-4.3 
 
-23 
 
-38 
 
-0.0 
 
0.5 
 
0.0 
 
35 
 
-24 
 
34 
 
16 
 
32 
 
-70 
primschool 
secnschool 
 
roadtransp 
 
watertransp 
 
watersupply 
 
elecsupply 
 
riceprice 
-307 
(45)** 
126 
(59)* 
148 
(54)** 
-112 
(43)** 
-223 
(53)** 
-65 
(67) 
0.09 
(0.04)* 
-85 
 
35 
 
38 
 
-30 
 
-57 
 
-18 
 
0.0 
633 
(318)* 
-297 
(269) 
1,117 
(613) 
623 
(293)* 
-640 
(286)* 
- 
- 
0.58 
(0.16)** 
42 
 
-28 
 
49 
 
41 
 
-74 
 
- 
 
0.05 
-331 
(46)** 
213 
(63)** 
143 
(54)** 
-116 
(44)** 
-94 
(55) 
-85 
(67) 
0.035 
(0.045) 
-100 
 
69 
 
41 
 
-34 
 
-27 
 
-26 
 
0.0 
 N = 7024 (1568 working) 
Log likelihood = -14579.7 
N = 1429 (83 working) 
Log likelihood = -836.4 
N = 5595 (1485 working) 
Log likelihood = -13658.2 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  Regressions include a constant term.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4. Tests for Labour Mobility and Market Access: Tobit Results for Rural Sample 
 Coeff. Slope Coeff. Slope Coeff Slope Coeff Slope Coeff. Slope Coeff Slope 
pcexp1 
 
pcexp2 
 
pcexp3 
 
pcexp4 
 
rte 
 
rteurb 
 
rte*kinh 
 
rte*girl 
 
rte*ag 
 
rteurb*roa
d 
 
rteurb*wat
er 
-757 
48** 
-1232 
111** 
-1558 
226** 
-1090 
313** 
-5.66 
2.25* 
2.58 
0.73** 
-144 
 
-177 
 
-187 
 
-170 
 
-1.68 
 
0.77 
-756 
48** 
-1240 
111** 
-1,573 
226** 
-1120 
314** 
-12.33 
4.24** 
2.81 
0.74** 
8.63 
4.63 
-144 
 
-178 
 
-188 
 
-172 
 
-3.66 
 
0.83 
 
2.56 
-750 
48** 
-1219 
111** 
-1547 
226** 
-1077 
312** 
-1.52 
3.24 
2.53 
0.73** 
 
 
-7.35 
4.15 
-142 
 
-176 
 
-186 
 
-168 
 
-0.45 
 
0.75 
 
 
 
-2.17 
-757 
48** 
-1232 
111** 
-1559 
226** 
-1092 
313** 
-4.96 
6.72 
2.58 
0.73** 
 
 
 
 
-0.77 
6.96 
-144 
 
-177 
 
-187 
 
-170 
 
-1.47 
 
0.77 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.23 
-757 
48** 
-1232 
111** 
-1558 
226** 
-1092 
313** 
-5.69 
2.25* 
1.84 
1.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.85 
1.83 
-144 
 
-177 
 
-187 
 
-170 
 
-1.69 
 
0.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.25 
-755 
48** 
-1230 
111** 
-1551 
226** 
-1084 
313** 
-5.71 
2.25* 
3.13 
0.83** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.06 
1.42 
-144 
 
-177 
 
-187 
 
-170 
 
-1.69 
 
0.93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.61 
N=5595 
(1485 
working) 
Log 
likelihood 
 
 
 
13652 
  
 
 
13650 
  
 
 
13650 
  
 
 
13652 
  
 
 
13652 
  
 
 
13651 
 
Notes:  Regressions control for variables shown in table 3 and it includes a constant term.  Standard errors shown below 
coefficients.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% for all the column except for the first column, where * means interaction. 
All Log likelihood are negative. 
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Table 5. Tobit Regressions of Hours of Work: Specification to Test Credit Constraints  
 Full Sample Urban Sample Rural Sample 
 Coefficient Slope Coefficient Slope Coefficient Slope 
pcexp1 
 
pcexp2 
 
pcexp3 
 
pcexp4 
 
rte 
 
rte*pcexp1 
 
rte*pcexp2 
 
rte* pcexp3 
 
rte*pcexp4 
-822 
(55)** 
-1,356 
(130)** 
-1,960 
(260)** 
-1,692 
(319)** 
-3.18 
(2.21) 
-1.14 
(2.70) 
0.40 
(4.51) 
6.31 
(7.14) 
-2.42 
(8.93) 
-136 
 
-164 
 
-174 
 
-172 
 
-0.86 
 
-0.31 
 
0.11 
 
1.69 
 
-0.65 
-1,851 
(455)** 
-2,146 
(588)** 
-2,332 
(765)** 
-2,340 
(827)** 
1.39 
(7.62) 
7.07 
(8.18) 
7.46 
(11.28) 
2.78 
(15.44) 
-10.85 
(18.23) 
-63.0 
 
-63.9 
 
-64.2 
 
-64.2 
 
0.14 
 
0.71 
 
0.75 
 
0.27 
 
-1.09 
726 
(59)** 
-1,192 
(155)** 
-2,001 
(434)** 
-2,062 
(814)* 
-2.79 
(2.86) 
-4.61 
(421) 
-3.66 
(882) 
26.22 
(21.59) 
48.62 
(34.87) 
-140 
 
-175 
 
-192 
 
-193 
 
-0.82 
 
-13.60 
 
-10.81 
 
7.74 
 
14.35 
 N = 7024 (1568 
working)  
LR chi2(28) = 2637.45 
Log likelihood = -
14579.728 
N = 1429 (83 
working) 
LR chi2(27) = 251.38 
Log likelihood = -
836.4 
N = 5595 (1485 
working) 
LR chi2(28) = 2204.23 
Log likelihood = -
13658.2 
Notes:  Regressions control for variables shown in table 3 and include a constant term.  Standard 
errors in parentheses.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The ‘*’ in first column indicates 
interaction term. 
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